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Abstract This paper investigates the varieties of reductionism and realism about
causal relations in macroeconometrics. There are two issues, which are kept
distinct in the analysis but which are interrelated in the development of
econometrics. The first one is the question of the reducibility of causal relations
to regularities, measured in statistics by correlations. The second one is the
question of the reducibility of causes among macroeconomic aggregates to
microeconomic behaviour. It is argued that there is a continuum of possible
positions between realism and reductionism for both the questions, but, as far as
the second question is concerned, the dominant position of mainstream
macroeconometrics is strongly reductionist. The paper defends an integrative
approach that emphasizes the gradual nature of many real world cases.
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1 INTRODUCTION
A fundamental question in the philosophy of causation is whether causes are
autonomous and observer-independent theoretical entities or they are
reducible to non-causal facts like regularities. The latter choice corresponds
to a reductionist approach, the former to a realist approach. Reductionist
approaches to causality have been influential in philosophy of science since
the time of Hume (see Hume 1739/40 and Hume 1748), and form the
philosophical underpinning of probabilistic theories of causality (see, for
example, Suppes 1970). Clive Granger’s (1969) definition of causality can be
interpreted as a paradigmatic application of the probabilistic theory to
econometrics. On the other hand, there are realist approaches to causality,
according to which causal relations have a reality autonomous from that of
regularities. This idea bases the structuralist account of causality in
econometrics of the Cowles Commission (see, for example, Haavelmo
1944, Simon 1953, Hurwicz 1962). In this account, the causal structure is
derived by economic theory and formalized in a system of linear equations.
Probability theory and statistical inference preserve an epistemological role.
This is the role of measuring the strength of causal relations and testing the
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restrictions derived from the theory and imposed on the system of
equations.
When one considers issues about causality in macroeconometrics, there is
another important sense in which reductionism is involved. Indeed, a crucial
question is whether causal relations among macroeconomic aggregates are
reducible to more fundamental causal relations, namely relations among
atomistic individual behaviours, or exist somewhat autonomously. This
question has been rightly underlined by Hoover (2001), who links the issue
of realism about causality in macroeconomics with a criticism of the
programme of microfoundations for macroeconomics.
These two different forms of reductionism, which are much entwined in
the development of econometrics, are separately scrutinized in this paper.
The philosophical lexicon used is however the same. This permits to defend
three claims. First, there is a continuum of possible positions between
reductionism and realism. No sane position is at the extremes. Realism and
reductionism are directions, and we show the macroeconometric approaches
that go in one direction or in the other.
Second, we can find a continuum of econometric practices between
reductionism and realism as regards the relationship between causes and
regularities. But, as to the other relationship (macro-causes and micro-
causes), the dominant position is strongly reductionist.
Third, we defend an approach analogous to the ‘integrative pluralism’
proposed by Sandra Mitchell for biology (Mitchell 2003). The complexity of
the subject studied by economics and the boundedness of our scientific
representations suggest that there are many levels of reduction for
macroeconomic causal relations – reductions both to statistical properties
and to microbehaviors – which need to be considered on a case-by-case basis
and to be integrated.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we address
the first question about reductionism: the relationship between causes and
regularities. There is a large variety of philosophical positions between realism
and reductionism. But the question regarded as central by the practitioners of
macroeconometrics is not ‘what are primary causes or probabilities?’, but
‘which relations remain stable?’. The third section is dedicated to this issue
and to the related problem of identification. The fourth section addresses the
problem of the relationship between causes among macroeconomic aggre-
gates and micro-behaviour. The fourth section puts forward the main claims
of the paper, presenting an integrative approach.
2 CAUSES AND REGULARITIES
The first issue of reductionism, that is relevant for the problem of causality
in macroeconometrics, is the relationship between causes and regularities.
The questions in this area are: which are primary – causal relations or
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regular conjunctions? Are causal relations nothing but regularities? Such
questions concern the ontology of causality.1 Besides, there are epistemo-
logical questions about the relationship between causes and regularities: is it
possible to have justified beliefs about causal relations starting from the
experience of regularities? If the regular conjunction is a symmetric relation
and causality is asymmetric, how do we infer the direction of causality? Is it
possible to measure the strength of a causal relation via statistical methods?
A group of answers to these questions can be labelled as reductionist.
Philosophers of science have scrutinized the varieties of reductionism –
ontological and epistemological – and have given a classification, according
to the strength of reductionism (see Silberstein 2002). For example, saying
that causal relations are nothing but regularities is tantamount to endorse
an identity-based reductionism or eliminative reductionism (if one is willing
to abandon causal claims). But there are weaker form of reductionism: one
can say that the properties of causal relations are determined completely by
the properties of regular conjunctions; this kind of reductionism would be
called nomological supervenience or determination-based reductionism
(Silberstein 2002: 84). Analogously, there is a classification of epistemolo-
gical reductionism. In strong versions of it, causal claims can be entirely
replaced by, or, more weakly, derived from statistical claims. In weak
versions, causal claims may be reducible to statistical claims, but may have a
pragmatic power, in terms of explanatory or predictive value, for example.
Realist and emergentist approaches are, roughly speaking, the converse of
reductionism. Realism about causal relations is primarily an ontological
claim: the reality of causal relations is autonomous from the reality of
regular conjunctions. One has then to solve the epistemological problem
of causal inference, and, for this scope, the use of statistical measures of
regularities is not ruled out. Emergentist approaches claim that the
properties of a whole or a complex ‘emerge from’ its parts, or, in other
terms, ‘go beyond the features of those parts’ (Silberstein 2002: 90). This
claim can be interpreted in an ontological sense, when with properties we
mean objective relations between real items, independent of any epistemic
consideration. But it can also be interpreted in an epistemological sense,
when with properties we mean relations that depend upon ‘our abilities to
comprehend the nature of the links or dependencies among real world items’
(Silberstein 2002: 90).
These philosophical approaches about the relationship between causes
and regularities form the substratum of the definitions of causality and the
methods of causal inference that we find in macroeconometrics. Our claim is
that more than definite positions classifiable as realist or reductionist, we
find in macroeconometrics a continuum of visions about causality. Some of
them go in the realist direction, some of them in the reductionist direction.
Besides, if we take into consideration the historical development of
econometrics, we record an evolution of positions about causality.
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As Hoover (1998) points out, two approaches are commonly found in
empirical economics, which he calls the probabilistic approach and the
structuralist approach. The probabilistic approach has its philosophical
roots in Hume. According to the traditional interpretation of Hume (pace
Strawson 1989), causal relations are ontologically reducible to noncausal
relations. Causes are not directly observable, but can be inferred by the
experience of ‘constant conjunctions’. In An Enquiry Concerning Human
Understanding (1748), Hume gives a twofold definition of causality: ‘we may
define a cause to be an object, followed by another, and where all the objects,
similar to the first, are followed by objects similar to the second. Or in other
words where, if the first object had not been, the second never had existed’
(Hume 1748: sect. VII, part II). The probabilistic theory of causality is
based, roughly speaking, on an elaboration of Hume’s first definition. This
theory was proposed principally by Suppes (1970). The direct predecessors
are Reichenbach (1956) and Good (1961–62); further developments are in
Eells (1991). The first definition of causality given by Suppes is the
following: an event A causes prima facie an other event B if and only if: (a) A
and B occur, and A occurs before B; (b) P(B|A).P(B) (Suppes 1970: 12).
The basic idea is that a cause must somewhat make its effect more likely. It
is an elaboration of Hume’s definition because it reduces the nature of
causes to probability distributions (instead of simple regularities), which are
directly measurable. As in Hume, the definition contains in itself the
procedure of inference.
Clive Granger’s account of causality, which is maybe the most influential
procedure of causal inference in econometrics, is based upon such a
probabilistic theory of causality (see Spohn 1984). Granger defines causality
in the following way. A variable A causes a variable B if the probability of B
conditioned on its own past history and the past history of A (besides the set
V of the available information) does not equal the probability of B
conditional on its own past history alone (and V) (Granger 1980).
The structuralist approach that we find in macroeconometrics goes more
into the direction of realism. It assumes the existence of economic structures
that are autonomous and primary with respect to regularities. Probability
relations do not enter in the ontology of causality, but enter in the
epistemology of causality, according to this approach. The Cowles
Commission method of economic modelling is based upon this approach.
Economic theory dictates the structure existing among macroeconomic
variables and the role of probability theory and statistics is that of
measuring the strength of causal relations, and that of testing the theoretical
restrictions.
Although the probabilistic and the structuralist approach go in opposite
directions – reductionist vs. realism – there is a continuum of positions. This
is because the fundamental question faced by the practitioners of
macroeconometrics is not ‘which relations – causes or regularities – are
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real?’, but ‘which relations are stable?’. With stable or autonomous relations,
one generally means relations that are invariant to interventions among
parameters. In a stable relation between A and B, one can manipulate A and
have a predictable outcome on B. That fits very well with one of the declared
goals of macroeconomics: that of suggesting policy interventions. In the
next section, we show how the concept of stable relation is connected with
that of causality and how these two concepts have been evolving.
3 STABLE RELATIONS2
3.1 The problem of identification
The thesis that the various econometric approaches to causality form a
continuum of positions between realism and reductionism is demonstrated
by the debate about autonomous or stable relations. The question as to
which relations are to be considered stable and may be used for policy
evaluation is strictly connected in econometrics with the problem of
identification. In an article of 1979, which has the title After Keynesian
Macroeconomics, Robert Lucas and Thomas Sargent write: ‘The problem of
identifying a structural model from a collection of economic time series is
one that must be solved by anyone who claims the ability to give
quantitative economic advice’ (Lucas and Sargent 1979: 298–99). Indeed,
the Lucas critique is directed to an approach to the problem of
identification, which Lucas and Sargent call Keynesian macroeconometrics,
and it is a proposal of an alternative method to address this problem.
Suppose Xt is a k61 vector of macroeconomic time series, which is
assumed to be non-stationary. The Wold representation is:
DXt~mzC Lð ÞEt, ð1Þ
where Et is a white noise vector, which is serially uncorrelated with a mean of
zero and variance-covariance matrix SE, C(L) is a lag polynomial (so that C
(L) Et5Et+C1 Et21+C2 Et22+…), and m is a constant term.3
Of course, there are infinite representations of this form, since it is
sufficient to define a lag polynomial A(L)5C(L) A0 for an appropriate
matrix A0 such that the vector ut5(A0)
21Et is still a white noise. What
economists are looking for, however, is a model that represents stable
relations and in which white noise terms are interpretable as economic
shocks. Such a model is called a structural model and has the form:
DXt~mzC Lð Þgt, ð2Þ
while the corresponding reduced form model is of the form (1) with Et5C0 gt
and C(L)5C(L) (C0)
21.
The solution to the identification problem consists in finding a way to
deduce gt and C (L) in (2) from Et and C (L) in (1).
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3.2 Cowles commission approach
In Keynesian macroeconometrics – which is the approach to econometrics
criticized both by Lucas and Sargent and, as we will show later, by
Christopher Sims – structural parameters are identified by the imposition of
several types of a priori restrictions, for example by classifying variables as
exogenous and endogenous. In the form of equation (2) this would
correspond to assuming that certain blocks of C0 are zero, as illustrated
in King et al. (1991).
Hoover notes that ‘there is a certain irony in criticizing any econometrics
as Keynesian, given Keynes’s own scepticism of econometrics. … What is of
course true is that most builders of large-scale macroeconometric models
classified themselves as Keynesian’ (1988: 270). Keynes’s scepticism about
the first developments of econometrics (see Keynes 1939) can be interpreted
as a consequence of his own view of economic causal structures. Keynes
points out that to measure economic relationships with statistical techniques
alone we would need beforehand a correct and complete list of the
significant causes, which seems to be a too demanding request to economic
theory (Keynes 1939: 560). Lawson (1989) claims that we can reconstruct
from Keynes’s writings a view of economic processes as constituting a non-
atomistic and open system (p. 247). What is certainly true is that Keynes is
very sceptical about the capacity of statistical techniques of being able to
measure a cause-effect relationship, because the mechanism that produces
such relationship is intertwined with other mechanisms (see, for example,
Keynes 1939: 560). However, Keynes believes that causal mechanisms do
exist in the economy and that knowledge of them is also possible, but we do
not obtain it from empirical regularities. In philosophical terms, Keynes’s
view of causality is strongly non-reductionist and realist: causal facts are
primary with respect to non-causal facts, such as empirical regularities.
Moreover, starting from the measuring such regularities we are not able to
get knowledge of causes, not even with the help of economic theory.
The Cowles Commission programme in econometrics aimed to give a
formal and quantitative treatment of the macroeconomic theories that had
been developed in the 1930s. The focus was Keynesian theory, but
interpreted as a general equilibrium system, and without endorsing
Keynes’s approach to probability and statistics. In The Probability
Approach to Econometrics (1944), Haavelmo proposes the following tenets:
(i) the economy as a whole may be characterized as a system of
relations of mutual-dependence type (where ‘everything depends
upon everything else’), but built up from systems of relations of
cause-effect type, which represents the various sectors of the
economy (Haavelmo 1944: 22);
(ii) it is possible to identify the structural parameters of these relations
from ‘a theoretical relation, a design of experiments and a set of
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observations’ (Haavelmo 1944: 14). The experiments are those
which ‘Nature is steadily turning out from her own enormous
laboratory, and which we merely watch as passive observers’
(Haavelmo 1944: 14);
(iii) these relations are essentially stochastic (Haavelmo 1944: 40).
Haavelmo is confident about the possibility of isolating autonomous
relations. To explain what is an autonomous relation, Haavelmo uses a
mechanical analogy:
If we should make a series of speed tests with an automobile, driving on a
flat, dry road, we might be able to establish a very accurate functional
relationship between the pressure on the gas throttle (or the distance of
the gas pedal from the bottom of the car) and the corresponding
maximum speed of the car. And the knowledge of this relationship might
be sufficient to operate the car at a prescribed speed. But if a man did not
know anything about automobiles, and he wanted to understand how
they work we should not advice him to spend time and effort in
measuring a relationship like that. Why? Because (1) such a relation
leaves the whole inner mechanism of a car in a complete mystery, and (2)
such a relation might break down at any time, as soon as there is some
disorder or change in any working part of the car. … We say that such a
relation has very little autonomy, because its existence depends upon the
simultaneous fulfillment of a great many other relations, some of which
are of transitory nature.
(Haavelmo 1944: 27–8)
Thus, what distinguishes autonomous relations from empirical regularities
is, on the one hand, the explanatory power, on the other hand the invariance
under new conditions. Haavelmo does not use the word causal in the quoted
passage (he uses more causal notions to refer to microbehaviours), but other
exponents of the Cowles Commission (see e.g. Simon 1953 and Hurwicz
1962) use the related concept of ‘invariance under intervention’ to define
those special causal relationships that constitute the structural equations in
an econometric model.
According to Haavelmo, ‘there are more fundamental relations than those
that appear before us when we merely stand and look’ (1944: 38). These
relations are among aggregates, but they are underpinned by ‘fundamental
behaviouristic relations’ that describe ‘individuals’ decisions to produce and
to consume’ (1944: 28). The fundamental relations are causal, according to
Haavelmo, in the sense that individuals take the best decisions given the
conditions in which they are involved. But Haavelmo claims that we are
able to discover autonomous relations among aggregates, not reducible
to constant relations. What distinguishes autonomy from constancy or
persistence of a relation is that autonomy ‘refers to a class of hypothetical
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variations in the structure, for which the relation would be invariant, while its
actual persistence depends upon what variations actually occur’ (1944: 29).
The definition of causality as structural relations invariant to
intervention given by Simon is analogous to Haavelmo’s notion of
autonomy. The focus of Simon (1953) is on the syntactic properties of the
model. The main issue is to determine what are the algebraic properties
that a model should satisfy in order to determine its causal ordering.
However, Simon’s (1953) discussion of observational equivalent systems
of equation and his definition of structural equations as those equations
representing causal relations invariant with respect to interventions
suggest that the ultimate interest is mapping to causal relations that
exist somewhat autonomously in the world.
How can these relations be tested and measured? The tools are given by
the well-known simultaneous equation models (SEM). In this approach, it is
assumed that there exists an underlying mechanism that generated the data.
It is emphasized, however, that without a priori restrictions imposed by
economic theory it would be almost impossible to identify (causal) economic
relationships.
In its declared objectives, the Cowles Commission methodology is non-
reductionist and realist. There is something in the reality at the macro-level
that distinguishes autonomous (Haavelmo) or causal (Simon) relationships
from empirical regularities. Haavelmo explains the causal relationships as
underpinned by causal microbehaviours, while Simon is more focused on
causality as a property of a model, but both authors believe in the possibility
of measuring causal properties of objective economic processes.
In the practice of econometrics, however, empirical studies inspired by the
Cowles Commission methodology often have failed to endorse a realist
approach. Especially in the 1970s, when doubts were increasing about the
reliability of Keynesian macroeconomic theory, econometricians were using
theoretical restrictions, without much believing on the real existence of
causal relations associated with such restrictions (for a criticism of this
practice, see Sims 1980). Lawson (1989) claims that Haavelmo’s approach is
ultimately instrumentalist. He states that Haavelmo’s concern about
autonomous relation denotes a realist orientation, but which is counter-
posed to a view of an econometric model as ‘serving merely as an instrument
or tool for deriving practical statements’. This is not enough, however, for
an instrumentalist position, as defined in philosophy of science: a realist
position does not exclude that models are instruments for deriving practical
statements. The instrumentalist position, on the other hand, typically
excludes that we find the goal of true representation of the reality among the
goals that a theory or a model is pursuing (Ma¨ki 1998). Since the goal of
representing the ‘real structure’ of the economy (Haavelmo 1944: 28) is
certainly present in the Haavelmo’s approach, the label of instrumentalist is
hardly applicable.
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However, when we consider the applications of the Cowles Commission
methodology, it becomes problematic to prove, in a non-experimental setting
such as economics, that some relations are invariant under interventions. In
order to achieve identification of large-scale econometric models, typically
used until the end of 1970s, a large class of a priori restrictions, which were
dictated not only by economic theory, but also by common practices not
grounded on representations of the reality, were used. Thus, in the econo-
metrics inspired by the Cowles Commission, we find a continuum of positions
between realism and reductionism, and between realism and instrumentalism.
The most realist-oriented positions are found in the theorizers of the Cowles
Commission approach, the most instrumentalist and reductionist-oriented
positions are found in the practitioners of the 1970s, inspired by such
approach, which treat regular relations as if they were generated by causal
structures, and models as useful instruments of predictions, without much
believing in their power of representing true causal relations of the world.
3.3 Lucas critique
Lucas points out that the restrictions imposed by the Keynesian approach to
macroeconometrics are not sound, because the parameters estimated are not
invariant to change of policy regime. Stable relations should be estimated
from the underlying choices of individual agents, according to Lucas. On
the other hand, Keynesian macroeconomics has neglected two ‘classic’
postulates: agents act in their own interest and markets clear.
The seminal paper of Lucas (1976) can be interpreted as a criticism of the
solution given to the identification problem by the Cowles approach, and of
the use of large-scale macroeconometric models based on this approach.
Lucas considers an analogous problem of autonomy or invariance.
His own important contribution [to the problem of invariance] is to
observe that one of the relations frequently omitted from putative causal
representations is that of the formation of expectations. He notes,
further, that the formation of expectations may depend upon people’s
understanding of the causal structure in general and of the process of
policy formation in particular.
(Hoover 1988: 191–2)
Macroeconometric models embody unstable relationships between aggre-
gate data, according to Lucas, as long as they do not represent the
optimization problems of agents in general equilibrium with rational
expectations. Hansen and Sargent (1980) propose a method to solve the
problem of identification, which is immune to Lucas critique. In the form of
equation (2), it would correspond to impose cross-equation restrictions on
the various elements of C(L). The peculiarity of these restrictions is that they
are grounded in the bedrock of given tastes and technology.
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Thus, the properties of an economic aggregate are to be explained,
according to Lucas, by reference to the behaviour of rational economic
agents such as postulated by neoclassical microeconomics. Moreover, Lucas
and his fellows recommend the use of representative agent models, in which
the behaviour of diverse agents is in turn reduced to choices of one
‘representative’ standard utility maximizing.
Stability of economic relations is confined within the microbehaviours, in
the Lucas’s approach. All the economic relations are to be founded on
individual decision-making processes, which take into account that
individual agents do their best given the available information. The rational
behaviour of economic agents is not coupled by relations that can be used
for economic policy control. One can argue that controllability is something
different and perhaps stronger than causality, by considering examples of
causal relations that vanish once the cause is used for control (Granger
1980). Indeed, the rational expectation hypothesis, while at the micro-level it
requires a notion of causal structure consistent with the notion used by the
Cowles Commission, involves the notion of Granger-causality, when it
considers aggregate macroeconomic variables. The concept of Granger-
causality is much weaker than controllability. A definition of Granger-
causality equivalent to the one given in section 2 is the following: a time
series {xt} (Granger) causes the time series {yt} if the knowledge of the past
and present values of {xt} contributes to forecasting {yt}, as it reduces the
variance of the prediction errors.
Granger-causality plays a ‘natural role’ in these models, because
agents’ decision rules typically involve predictions of future values of the
stochastic processes, say wt, that they care about but cannot control, e.g.,
in competitive models output prices and/or input prices. … All processes
[which regard aggregate macroeconomic variables] agents see and that
Granger cause wt belong in agents’ decision rules.
(Hansen and Sargent 1980: 92)
In philosophical terms, Lucas’s approach is reductionist, in the sense that
macroeconomic causal relations are reduced to micro-behaviours in which
predictability of macroeconomic variables plays a primary role. However,
Lucas claims that we are able to distinguish between objective micro-
economic structures and empirical regularities. Thus, at the micro-level
Lucas maintains a realist position.
3.4 VAR approach
Sims (1980) pursues the criticism of traditional macroeconomic models
further. He claims that ‘econometricians imposed large numbers of
restrictions that were incredible in the sense that they did not arise from
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sound economic theory or institutional or factual knowledge, but simply
from the need of the econometrician to have enough restrictions to secure
identification’ (Hoover 1995: 6). But the reaction is alternative to the
rational-expectations econometrics approach. While one stream of econo-
metric research after the Lucas critique continued to pursue identification of
structural models, by using restrictions grounded in individual decision-
making, Sims argues that economic relations are in principle not
identifiable: ‘Sims proposed that macroeconometrics give up the impossible
task of seeking identification of structural models and instead ask only what
could be learned from macroeconomic data without imposing restrictions’
(Hoover 1995: 6).
The approach proposed by Sims deals with unrestricted reduced form
equations, namely Vector Autoregressive (VAR) models. Each variable is
considered as endogenous and it is regressed on lagged values of itself and of
all the other variables. Sims (1982) argues that his programme is immune to
the Lucas critique, because policy action consists in an ‘implementation of a
fixed or slowly changing rule’ and so the agents form probability
distributions over the range of possible policy stances. The shocks embody
all the surprises and innovations to the information set of economic agents.
More generally, in VAR models, the shocks represent exogenous actions
on the economy. These actions are usually given a causal interpretation,
although they cannot be systematically exploited by the policymakers. A
large part of the literature about VAR models has been dedicated to
transforming the random terms, in order to get uncorrelated exogenous
shocks, which can be given an economic interpretation. In terms of
equation (2), Sims (1980) assumes that the covariance matrix Sg of the
structural shocks gt is diagonal and that C0 is triangular. The form of C0
reflects the causal structure among the contemporaneous variables: if C0 is
triangular we have a Wold causal chain, in which each variable causes all the
variable below in the vector and each variable does not cause any variable
above in the vector.4 Since the orthogonalizing transformations form an
observationally equivalent class, the so-called Structural VAR approach
proposes to use for the identification restrictions derived from a priori
knowledge or economic theory (see, for example, Bernanke 1986). Thus,
Structural VAR models recover some issues of the Cowles-Haavelmo
approach. In fact, VAR models end up to be very widely used by very
different econometric and economic schools.
In the Sims’s approach, macroeconomic relations are not stable under
intervention, since they cannot be exploited by policymakers (as in Lucas).
Is there something in the relations between shocks and variables, which has
a causal attribute or at least distinguishes such relations from empirical
regularities? Theoretically yes, but the true economic shocks are not
identifiable from data alone and using much a priori restrictions would be to
repeat the flaws of large-scale macroeconomic models, according to Sims.
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Therefore, VAR models are often used more for their predictive power,
than as an explanation of causal relations (see Stock and Watson 2001).
Structural analysis is limited to measure the effects of the shocks calculating
impulse response functions, which are the partial derivatives of each
variable with respect to each shock. But, since the impulse response function
depends on the way the structural shocks have been derived from the
reduced form, the problem of identification reappears.
In the context of VAR models it is rather straightforward to set tests of
Granger-causality, which has been mentioned for the rational expectations
models. But Granger-causality is more a measure of incremental predicta-
bility than of causality, as it has been pointed out by several works (see, for
example, Leamer 1985, Hoover 2001).
In philosophical terms, the VAR programme proposed by Sims (1980) is
more oriented towards an instrumentalist and reductionist position. It tends
to instrumentalism, because the identification of real causal structures is not
pursued. The main focus is prediction or the collecting of stylized facts to be
confronted with theories, but without believing that econometric tools
capture a structure not reducible to statistical regularities.5 It tends to
reductionism, in the sense that causal relations are reduced to non-causal
facts (statistical properties).
However, the developments of Structural VAR (Bernanke 1986,
Blanchard and Watson 1986, Sims 1986), to which Sims himself contributes,
are an attempt to give a more realist flavour to the study of the structural
shocks and the impulse response functions: the goal is to find reliable a priori
restrictions about the contemporaneous structure of the variables, that
permit an economically meaningful interpretation of economic shocks.
Recent works on Structural VAR (see, for example, Swanson and Granger
1997, Awokuse and Bessler 2003, Demiralp and Hoover 2003, Moneta 2003)
also have a more realist orientation. They try to articulate the actual
contemporaneous causal structure of the macroeconomic variable, starting
from the study of the partial correlations among estimated VAR residuals.
But this can be done only assuming a priori that a contemporaneous causal
structure is invariant in a certain time window.
4 MACRO-CAUSES AND MICRO-CAUSES
As the issues raised by the Lucas Critique show, there is another question
about causality, which is intertwined with the question about the
relationship between causes and regularities, but which we should keep
conceptually distinct. This is the question about the relationship between
causes among macroeconomic variables and causes among microeconomic
variables, which we shall call the relationship between macro- and micro-
causes. This question is intertwined with the question about the
relationship between causes and regularities, because the relationship
444 Articles
between macro- and micro-causes could be a relationship via regularities
among macroeconomic variables and regularities among microeconomic
variables. However, it should be kept distinct, because one can have
different positions about the relationship between macro- and micro-level
both in the reductionist and in the realist approach to causes/regularities.
In other words, one can be realist about the relationship between causes
and regularities, but can claim that macro-causes are entirely reducible to
micro-causes, and one can be reductionist about the relationship between
causes and regularities, but can claim that regularities among macro-
economic aggregates are autonomous from regularities among micro-
economic variables.
To analyse the relationship between macro- and micro-causes, we can use
the same philosophical language we have used to interpret the varieties of
relationships between causes and regularities. Analogously to the questions
posed at the beginning of section 2, there is a first group of questions that
are ontological: do macro-causes exist independently of micro-causes, or are
completely determined by micro-causes? Are macro-causes nothing but
micro-causes? Here the ontology of the relation is very much connected with
the ontology of the relata. In other words, these questions are very
connected with questions about the reducibility of macroeconomic variables
to microeconomic variables. A second group of questions are epistemolo-
gical: can we theorize about and model macro-causes directly, or do we need
to derive all aggregate behavioural specifications from atomistic individual
behaviour?
Again, we may have varieties of ontological and epistemological
reductionism. If one claims that macro-causes do not actually exist, and
that they are just micro-causes, one defends an identity or eliminative (if one
is willing to abandon claims about macro-causes) reductionism. There are
weaker forms of ontological reductionism: one can say that macro-causes
are completely determined by micro-causes and/or that macro-causes are
supervenient upon micro-causes. What this means is that if two possible
worlds W and W* agree with respect to the micro-causes, they must also
agree with respect to the macro-causes (see Tooley 1993: 173).
We may also have varieties of epistemological reductionism. One can
argue that macro-causal claims have to be replaced by micro-causal claims,
that macro-causal claims are to be derived from micro-causal claims, or that
macro-causal claims are in principle derivable from micro-causal claims but
the former maintain a pragmatic power.
Analogously to what we said in section 2, we may have realist and
emergentist positions, which are the converse of reductionist positions.
Emergentist positions about the relationship between macro- and micro-
causes claim that the properties of macro-causes go beyond the properties of
micro-causes. Again, this statement can be interpreted in an ontological or
an epistemological sense.
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Our point here is that we have a continuum of philosophical positions
between reductionism and emergentism about the relationship between
macro- and micro-causes, but in the practice of macroeconometrics we find
as dominant paradigm the extremely reductionist position of Lucas. The
programme of microfoundations established by Lucas aims to reduce
macroeconomics to microeconomics so that ‘the term ‘macroeconomic’ will
simply disappear from use and the modifier ‘micro’ will become superfluous’
(Lucas 1987: 107). The macroeconometric models after the Lucas critique
are prevalently built upon the idea that the sources of causal relations
among macroeconomic variables are in the decisions of individual agents. In
fact, it is very reasonable to conceive macroeconomic variables as the
outcome of the interaction of large numbers of decisions and behaviours
made by agents and institutions. The problem is that in the class of models
promoted by Lucas and his fellows – representative agent models – all the
activities pursued by individuals are modelled ‘as the choice of one
‘representative’ standard utility maximizing individual whose choices
coincide with the aggregate choices of the heterogenous individuals’
(Kirman 1992: 117).
The identity-based and, for many respects, eliminative reductionism
pursued by Lucas has exerted a great influence on macroeconometric
models building, but it has also been strongly criticized. Hoover (2001), for
example, defends the thesis that macroeconomic aggregates supervene upon
microeconomic reality.
What this means is that … if two parallels worlds possessed exactly the
same configurations of microeconomic or individual economic elements,
they would also possess exactly the same configurations of macro-
economic elements. It is not the case, however, that the same
configuration of macroeconomic elements implies the same configuration
of microeconomic elements.
(Hoover 2001: 120)
Supervenience, can be interpreted, as mentioned above in this section, as a
weak version of reductionism, alternative to the stronger version of
eliminative or identity-based reductionism. Hoover’s argument in defence
of supervenience is instrumental to establish that macroeconomics is
suitable subject for a realist causal account and that, as a consequence,
‘the central rationales for the programme of microfoundations for
macroeconomics’ can be eliminated (Hoover 2001: 109).
The representative-agent models have been strongly criticized by Kirman
(1992). His main argument is that ‘[t]here is simply no direct relation
between individual and collective behavior’. Indeed, ‘there is no plausible
formal justification for the assumption that the aggregate of individuals,
even maximizers, acts itself like an individual maximizer’. Moreover, ‘the
sum of the behavior of simple economically plausible individuals may
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generate complicated dynamics’ (Kirman 1992: 118). What Kirman seems to
suggest is a more sophisticated form of derivative reductionism: macro-
causes may be derivable from microeconomic behaviours but the composi-
tional principle may be non-additive or non-linear.
There are other criticisms more directed against methodological indivi-
dualism, to which the programme of microfoundations aspires. However,
methodological individualism is a broader principle than the Lucas’s
programme of microfoundations. According to methodological individua-
lism, ‘explanations of social, political, or economic phenomena can only be
regarded as adequate if they run in terms of the beliefs, attitudes, and
decisions of individuals’ (Blaug 1992: 44). In this context, the question that
arises is: is it possible to conceive causal relations among macroeconomic
aggregates that are under-determined by microeconomic decisions? In other
words, could there be relations among aggregates with some degrees of
invariance with respect to microeconomic decisions?
For example, Martel (1996: 141) claims that ‘it is methodologically
acceptable to theorize about and model aggregate behavior directly, without
requiring all behavioral specifications to be derived from atomistic
individual behaviors’. This statement can be interpreted as a form of
epistemological emergentism.
On the other hand, it would be possible to defend ontological
emergentism about the relationship between macro- and micro-causes.
There have been some efforts to define an emergent property in economics.
For example Hodgson (1998: 157) defines an emergent property as a feature
of a complex system that
(i) can in principle be described in terms of entities at the macro-level,
without references to the attributes of the micro-level;
(ii) persists longer than the underlying micro-interactions;
(iii) is not explicable entirely in terms of properties of elements at the
micro-level (see also Lane 1993: 91).
5 AN INTEGRATIVE APPROACH
This investigation about the varieties of reductionism and realism, as
regards the specific problems of the relationship between causes and
regularities, and of the relationship between causes among macroeconomic
aggregates and microeconomic behaviours, suggests three points, which are
the main claims of this paper.
First, there is a continuum of possible positions between reductionism
and realism (see, for example, Silberstein 2002: 99). Generally speaking,
realism (or emergentism) and reductionism are directions, and not positions.
No sane position is at the extremes. This is particularly clear for the case of
the relationship between causes and regularities, and of the relationship
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between macro- and micro-causes. For example, the position that causes
among economic variables exist completely autonomously from regularities
– let alone mind-independency – does not fit with the standard interpreta-
tion of causal claims in economics. Economists, especially macroeconomists,
are interested on those causes that are connected with a regular behaviour of
economic variables. That is probably due to epistemological reasons, since
we are able to measure causes as long as they repeatedly produce their
effects, or, at least, it is simpler to measure causes connected with regular
behaviours. There may also be pragmatic reasons: causes that are connected
to regular observations are exploitable and thus useful – in economic terms –
for economic agents. The interest on causes expressing regularities may be,
of course, completely consistent with the non-reductionist claim that causes
are primary with respect to regularities. The non-reductionist position,
however, cannot be taken to extremes of complete independence: causes
relevant to economics are strictly connected to regularities and drawing the
borderline between causes and regularities (or deciding what is primary) is
not always an easy task.
On the other hand, the position that causal relations are completely
reducible to non-causal states of affairs does not fit with the standard
interpretation of causal claims in economics either. When we speak about
causes in economics, we would like to have something more than constant
conjunctions, say correlations. First of all, we would like to have a relation
that is asymmetric, and not symmetric like correlation. This is connected
with the issue of control mentioned before: a correlation can be hardly
exploited for policy intervention. Moreover, the actual existence of
theoretical entities like causes or structures (as opposed to empirical
regularities) seems to be the base of success and explanatory power of
science. In a nutshell, causes without regularities seems a too strong claim,
regularities without causes a too weak claim.
Analogous considerations can be formulated as regards to the relation-
ship between macro- and micro-causes. A strong emergentist position about
macro-causes is hard to defend. Indeed, such a position would imply that
the properties of macroeconomic aggregates are ontologically independent
of microbehaviours, and that the former are not derivable from the latter.
But that would leave macro-causes themselves in a mystery. On the other
hand, a strong reductionist position as regards macro- to micro-causes
neglects the complexity of aggregation, as illustrated in section 4.
In the development of econometrics, as far as the relationship between
causes and regularities is concerned, we find a continuum of positions. We
have also find an historical tendency: from positions that go in the realist
direction with the Cowles Commission approach, to positions that go in the
reductionist direction with the VAR approach.
The second point we want to make is that, while we find in the
development of econometrics a continuum of positions between realism and
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reductionism, as to the relationship between causes and probabilities, in
mainstream empirical macroeconomics, we do not find a continuum of
positions between emergentism and reductionism, as far as the relationship
between macro-causes and micro-causes is concerned. Indeed, the majority
of macroeconometric models is built upon the tenets of Lucas’s programme
of microfoundations, which represents a strong type of reductionism, as
argued in section 4.
Third, our investigation suggests that causal relations play a strong
pragmatic role in scientific knowledge. There is no unique definition of
causes and no unique reduction of macro-causes to microbehaviours.
The relationship between causes and regularities depends strongly upon
our belief of existence of theoretical laws (if there is), or upon our belief as
to what remains stable in the processes under investigation. Recent
developments of procedures to draw causal inferences from statistical data
have clarified the complex relations between causes and correlations
(Spirtes et al. 2000, Pearl 2000). The idea is to use the rigorous language of
graphical models to represent causal structures. The procedure of causal
inference is based upon two assumptions. The first – the Causal Markov
Condition – says (translated from the technical language of graphical
models) that, given a group of variables V5{X1, …, Xn} and a probability
distribution over V, for every variable Xi in V it holds that, conditional on
its direct causes, Xi is independent of every other variable in V except its
effects.6 The second – the Faithfulness Condition – says that every
conditional independence relationship true in the probability distribution is
also implied by the Causal Markov Condition. As Pearl (2000) points out
the Faithfulness condition is equivalent to a condition about stability.
Indeed, the Faithfulness condition says that every conditional indepen-
dence relation is generated by the causal structure, and that those
dependencies that are not stable vanish when the parameters are slightly
modified.
It is important to notice that such conditions set the boundary of the
derivability of causal relations from correlations. For example, there are
environments where we should expect these conditions to be violated. The
Causal Markov condition does not hold if relevant variables to the causal
structure are not included in V, if probabilistic dependencies are drawn from
non-homogenous populations, if variables are not properly distinct from
one another or if we are in environments (for example in quantum
mechanical experiments) where causality cannot assumed to be local in time
and space. However, in all the environments where we can exclude ‘nonsense
correlations’ and assume temporal and spatially local causality, we can
assume the Causal Markov condition to be satisfied. Moreover, if we can
assume a satisfactorily degree of stability, we can also assume Faithfulness.
This suggests, again, that there is a continuum of possible situations about
the relationship between causes and regularities.
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Regarding the relationship between causes among macroeconomic
aggregates and microbehaviour, what the investigation suggests is that
there may be causal relations at different levels of the scientific (economic)
discourse and among different levels. What we are trying to defend here is a
form of ‘integrative pluralism’, analogous to what defended by Sandra
Mitchell (2003) for biology. Mitchell argues that the complexity of the
subject studied by biology and the various sciences ‘and the limitations of
our representations of acquired knowledge jointly entail an integrative,
pluralistic model of science’ (2003: 2). This consideration can be easily
extended to economics. We have different levels of aggregation and we can
find ‘intra-ordinal’ causal relations, which connect properties of the
aggregates of the same order, and ‘trans-ordinal’ causal relations, which
connect properties of different orders. There is no level that is causally
sufficient for the other levels, even if the entities from which all aggregates
are built are ultimately one kind, which is individual human beings.
The rejection of the strong varieties of reductionism, however, should not
lead us endorse ‘anything goes’ pluralism, usually associated with
Paul Feyerabend’s epistemological anarchism (Feyerabend 1975). Mitchell
argues that there is a middle ground between ‘the advocacy of retaining
all, possibly inconsistent, theories that emerge from a community of
investigators’ and ‘the insistence that any collection of analyses of the
same phenomena must be reduced to a single theory’ (Mitchell 2003: 186).
The integrative pluralism defended by Mitchell is alternative also to an
isolationist approach, that defends a vision of scientific enterprise as
founded on multiple levels of analysis, but neglects questions about the
relations among the different levels of analysis.
We have defended a similar pluralist ontology about causes in
macroeconometrics. That means that any approach to the two relationships
considered (causes vs. regularities and macro-causes vs. micro-causes)
should emphasize the gradual and fragmentary nature of many real world
cases, and that richer scientific explanations can be obtained, if the different
levels of causes are integrated.
Alessio Moneta
Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa
amoneta@sssup.it
NOTES
1 There are also important ontological questions as to what sort of things the
relata of causality exactly are – whether they are events, facts, states of affairs,
propositions, etc. – and questions about the relationship between the relata of
causality and the relata of regularities, but we do not face this issue here, and we
assume that the relata are just macroeconomic variables, without going more
deeply into this issue; something more about this will be said in section 4.
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2 This section is built upon Moneta (2004: section 1.3).
3 The illustration of the identification problem in this terms and notation follows
King et al. (1991: 822).
4 In that case, C0 can be easily obtained via the Choleski factorization of the
covariance matrix of the estimated residuals SE.
5 In fact there is a somewhat circular reasoning in some Structural VAR
econometric practices, as argued by Uhlig (1999): to obtain such stylized facts
several alternative theoretical restrictions are used and the criterion of choice
among them turns out often to be the conforming of the empirical results to the
accepted background theoretical knowledge.
6 The Causal Markov Condition can also be seen as a graphical interpretation of
the principle of the common cause, formulated by Reichenbach (1956). The
principle of common cause says that if Xi and Xj are probabilistically
dependent, then either Xi causes Xj, or Xj causes Xi, or Xi and Xj are effects
of some common cause Xh.
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